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Abstract—Among storage components, hard disk drives
(HDDs) have become the most commonly-used type of non-
volatile storage due to their recent technological advances, includ-
ing, enhanced energy efficacy and significantly-improved areal
density. Such advances in HDDs have made them an inevitable
part of numerous computing systems, including, personal com-
puters, closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, medical bedside
monitors, and automated teller machines (ATMs).
Despite the widespread use of HDDs and their critical role
in real-world systems, there exist only a few research studies
on the security of HDDs. In particular, prior research studies
have discussed how HDDs can potentially leak critical private
information through acoustic or electromagnetic emanations.
Borrowing theoretical principles from acoustics and mechan-
ics, we propose a novel denial-of-service (DoS) attack against
HDDs that exploits a physical phenomenon, known as acoustic
resonance. We perform a comprehensive examination of physical
characteristics of several HDDs and create acoustic signals that
cause significant vibrations in HDDs internal components. We
demonstrate that such vibrations can negatively influence the
performance of HDDs embedded in real-world systems. We show
the feasibility of the proposed attack in two real-world case
studies, namely, personal computers and CCTVs.
Index Terms—Hard disk drives, acoustic resonance, denial-of-
service, reliability, security, closed-circuit television.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of storage components, along with
the miniaturization of powerful computing units, has led to
an exponential increase in the number of sensing, monitoring,
and computing systems, forming the modern era of computing.
Among storage devices, hard disk drives (HDDs) have become
the most commonly-used type of non-volatile storage in the
market due to their superior advantages over other storage
devices. Since their introduction in the 1950s, their energy
efficacy, reliability, fault tolerance, and storage capacity have
significantly improved while their sizes have decreased dras-
tically [1]–[3]. These technological advances in HDDs, along
with the ever-increasing need for storing the huge amount
of data, made them one of the core components of modern
computing systems. Indeed, HDDs are now an inevitable part
of numerous ubiquitous systems, including, but not limited to,
personal computers, cloud servers, medical bedside monitors,
closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, and automated teller
machines (ATMs).
We argue that the security of HDDs has been overlooked
despite their critical role in computing systems. HDDs hold
essential software components (e.g., the operating system) and
various forms of sensitive information (e.g., camera footage in
CCTVs), and thus, can be an appealing target for a plethora
of attackers. Biedermann et al. [4] have shown that HDDs
can minimally leak some private information through the
electromagnetic signal generated by their regular operation.
Moreover, Guri et al. [5] have recently demonstrated the
feasibility of using acoustic sounds created by HDDs to form
a covert channel in air-gapped computers. They suggested that
a malware installed on a compromised system can control
the movements of the HDD’s read/write arm in an attempt
to generate acoustic signals, which can leak private data from
the system.
We pursue an entirely different angle to the security of
HDDs, motivated by the insight that computer systems heavily
rely on the availability of HDDs and even a short period of
unavailability/unreliability in their operations may lead to the
failure of the whole system, causing serious consequences.
Borrowing concepts from resonance scattering theory, we
propose a novel attack against HDDs based on the acoustic
resonance that can completely halt the normal operation of
HDDs in real-world systems. Acoustic resonance is a well-
known physical phenomenon in which an acoustic signal
(generated at specific frequencies) causes vibrations in an
object, potentially leading to the destruction of the object.
Our key contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first
instance of non-contact denial of service security attacks
against HDDs.
2) We investigate how an attacker can take advantage
of a well-known physical phenomenon, called acoustic
resonance, to negatively affect the regular operation of
HDDs, and discuss how the attacker can find the appro-
priate frequencies for launching the proposed attack.
3) We examine several models of state-of-the-art HDDs.
As shown in Section IV, our attack can completely halt
the read/write operations of all experimented models.
4) We further highlight the negative consequences of the
proposed attack using two real-world case studies,
namely, CCTV and desktop personal computer systems.
We demonstrate how an attacker can disable a CCTV
system by targeting its digital video recorder (DVR)
device. Further, we show how the proposed attack can
target a personal computer, causing a failure in its
underlying OS.
5) To prove our hypothesis that the attack is caused by
acoustic resonance, we disassemble an HDD and demon-
strates that the attack frequencies (i.e., the frequencies
at which the acoustic sound can cause a failure in
the HDDs) match the resonance frequencies of HDD
platters.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides a short background on acoustic resonance and the
structure of HDDs. Section III discusses the threat model.
Section IV describes how we perform the proposed attack
on several models of HDDs and shows how an attacker
can find the acoustic resonance of an HDD in a controlled
environment. Section V shows how the proposed attack can
cause serious failures in realistic scenarios, in particular, it
describes the attack against two real-world systems. Section VI
briefly discusses how our empirical results match the outcomes
predicted by the physics behind the attack. The related work
is explained in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first discuss how acoustic resonance
happens. We then describe the internal structure of state-of-
the-art hard drives and their fundamental components.
A. Acoustic Resonance
Resonance is a physical phenomenon in which a source of
vibration forces an object to oscillate with greater amplitude
at specific frequencies, referred to as resonance frequencies.
At resonance frequencies, even small forces generated by the
source of vibration can create large-amplitude oscillations [6].
This phenomenon has been extensively studied in mechanic as
well as construction. When designing an urban infrastructure,
it is essential to carefully examine its resonance frequencies.
For example, bridge designers must ensure that its natural
frequencies are much greater than the expected frequency of
any forces that are likely to act on the structure (for example,
the wind) [7]. In this paper, we focus on a specific form
of resonance, called acoustic resonance, where a source of
acoustic waves creates a periodic signal at a certain frequency
close to the object, causing mechanical vibrations. In partic-
ular, we aim to exploit this phenomenon to target HDDs and
cause unintentional vibration in the fundamental components
of HDDs.
B. Structure of Hard Drives
A typical HDD consists of two fundamental components: (i)
platters, flat circular disks that are covered by a thin film of
a ferromagnetic material, and (ii) read-write heads, which are
positioned very close to platters. In a modern HDD, the data is
stored on platters and heads are responsible for reading/writing
the data from/to platters as the rotate at a very high speed (for
most of the consumer-grade HDDs, platters spin at either 5,400
or 7,200 rotations per minute). Next, we briefly describe how
read/write operations work.
• Write operation: The HDD’s internal circuits control the
movement of the head and the rotation of the disk, and
perform writes on demand from the disk controller. For a
write operation, the corresponding head (one of multiple
heads that has access to the requested location of the
platter) first moves to a designated area on the platter,
where it can modify the magnetization of the data cells
(i.e., physical spaces on the disk platter in which a single
bit is stored) as they pass under it.
• Read operation: In order to read the data stored on
platters, the motor first spins up the platters, and a read-
write head moves itself to the appropriate position above
the platter which contains the requested data. The head
can immediately detect the magnetization of the material
passing under it: changes in magnetism induce a current
in the head, which is decoded by the HDDs internal
circuits and converted into a binary value.
III. THREAT MODEL
In this section, we first describe negative consequences of
acoustic resonance on HDDs and briefly mention how these
consequences can affect real-world systems. We then discuss
motivation of a potential attacker and our assumption about
her capabilities.
A. Problem definition
Driven by rapid advances in storage technologies, state-of-
the-art HDD offer a high areal density: over 1.2 gigabits can
be stored on an area of one square inch [8]. Providing such a
high areal density requires a careful design of a head positing
scheme that can accurately place read/write heads of the HDD
in the appropriate position. Indeed, even a small displacement
of the head leads to malfunctioning of the HDD and may even
accidentally scratch the platters, causing permanent damage
to the HDD. In this paper, we aim to demonstrate an active
attack against HDDs in which the adversary aims to cause
misplacement of internal read/write heads. As demonstrated
later in Section IV, an intentionally-generated acoustic signal
can cause unwanted acoustic resonance in fundamental com-
ponents of HDDs, leading to seek failures (i.e., heads cannot
be precisely located at the platter location where the data
will be read or written). As shown in two real-world systems
(Section V), the proposed attack can be exploited to cause
consecutive seek failures in an HDD, leading to severe failures
in the whole system that relies on the HDD. For example, it
can momentarily stop the normal operation of an operating
system (OS) running on a personal computer or even cause it
to freeze, requiring a reboot. To the best of our knowledge,
the proposed attack offers the first non-contact DoS attack
against HDDs. We provide a proof-of-concept of the proposed
attack, shedding light on an overlooked security vulnerability
of HDDs.
B. Potential attackers and their capabilities
Due to the vital role of HDDs in numerous computing
systems, we envision them to be an interesting target for a
plethora of attackers. In particular, we assume that attackers
may be interested in launching DoS attacks against a variety of
mission-critical systems (e.g., a CCTV camera, a cloud server,
or an industrial automation/monitoring system) by exploiting
the susceptibilities of their HDDs.
We assume that attackers can neither directly control nor
touch the HDD. Instead, we assume the attacker can create the
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Fig. 1. Experimental setup for performing acoustic attacks.
Fig. 2. The HDD SMART self-test fails with servo/seek failure under acoustic
attack (test number 1).
acoustic signal at specific frequencies to affect the availability
of HDDs. We assume that the attacker can generate acoustic
signals in the vicinity of the victim device, at frequencies
within the audible range (2 - 20 kHz). The attacker can either
apply the signal by using an external speaker or exploit a
speaker near the target. Toward this end, the attacker may
potentially take advantage of remote software exploitation
(for example, remotely controlling the multimedia software
in a vehicle or personal device), deceive the user to play a
malicious sound attached to an email or a web page [9], or
embed the malicious sound in a widespread multimedia (for
example, a TV advertisement). The attacker is also able to
control the amplitude (consequently power) of the acoustic
signal within the stated frequency range.
We do not put any limit on the ability of the attacker to
study a specific targeted HDD in a controlled environment: the
attacker can explore various vulnerabilities of a specific HDD
or a system that has the HDD before launching the attack.
Indeed, we assume that the attacker can reverse engineer
a sample-computing system to extract the exact model of
its HDDs and investigate the system’s behavior when he
creates different acoustic signals with various frequencies and
amplitudes.
IV. ISOLATED ACOUSTIC RESONANCE ATTACKS
In this section, we explain how we perform acoustic DoS
attacks on HDDs in isolation. By performing the acoustic
attack without any barrier shielding the HDD, we maximize
its exposure to sounds waves to better analyze potential
vulnerabilities. Later in Section V, we perform the attack on
settings where hard drives are embedded in device cases.
A. Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup is depicted in Figure 1. A function
generator was used as a precise source to feed an amplifier.
TABLE I
ATTACK FREQUENCY RANGES FOR FOUR DIFFERENT HDD MODELS.
HDD Model Capacity Attack FrequencyWindow(s) (Hz)
WD3200AAKS-75L9A0 320 GB [2,300 - 2,510]
WD5000AAKS-75A7B0 500 GB
[2,240 - 2,520]
[3,800 - 4,020]
[4,725 - 5,006]
WD10EZEX-08WN4A0 1 TB
[2,265 - 2,281]
[2,455 - 2,503]
[6,700 - 6,845]
[8,212 - 8,873]
[12,839 - 12,840]
WD40EZRZ-00GXCB0 4 TB
[4,590 - 6,550]
[7,502 - 7,900]
[8,398 - 8,618]
[9,420 - 10,200]
The output of the amplifier was then connected to a speaker
and monitored by an oscilloscope. We mounted the speaker on
an arm hood to be able to study the implications of strength
(controlled by distance) and direction of sound waves on the
feasibility of the attack. A sound-level meter was used to mea-
sure the sound level in dbA. We covered the surrounding of
the device under attack with acoustic panels that absorb sound
to alleviate unwanted reflections. Throughout the experiments,
the operator was protected with professional earmuffs.
For testing HDDs, the target HDD was connected to a PC
via a USB 3 SATA adapter. The standard read/write benchmark
from the Linux Disk Utility was used to monitor the impact
of sound on the performance of the disk drive. In addition, we
used the Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology
(SMART) interface through the smartmontools Linux
package to gather detailed information on hard drive health.
SMART is implemented in many modern hard drives and is
widely used in HDD reliability studies [10]–[13].
B. Halting Read/Write Operations through Sound
In our first experiment, we connected different disk drives to
the computer externally and exposed them to a varying sound
frequency while performing the disk performance benchmark
mentioned in Section IV-A. We then recorded frequency
ranges leading to a full halt in read and write operations.
During this experiment, the speaker was kept at a close
distance (10 cm) with a fixed angle towards the disk under
attack. We analyze the importance of the attack angle later.
Table I reflects the attack frequency ranges for four different
HDD models with different storage capacities. While some of
these attack windows are remarkably wide, some are as narrow
as a few hertz. It is worth mentioning that we were not able
to find any ultrasound (> 20KHz) attack frequencies using
an ultrasound speaker.
Following successful acoustic attacks, SMART logs of
tested HDDs showed increased Seek_Error_Rate, an or-
dinarily pre-failure attribute [12]. This kind of failure does not
affect the data integrity but can hurt the performance. We also
ran the SMART extended self-test with and without perform-
ing the acoustic attack. The test under attack failed due to
Fig. 3. Maximum distance of successful acoustic attacks as a function of attack angle for a 1 TB as well as a 4 TB hard disk drive. Each HDD has been
tested for two of its major resonance frequencies.
servo/seek failure (Figure 2) confirming the previous
observation. The physics behind the attack is explained later
in Section VI, but in summary, such seek errors are caused by
rotational vibrations in HDD platters. This explains the higher
susceptibility of denser HDDs to this attack (see Table I), since
seeking smaller magnetic regions on the platter requires higher
precision.
C. Determining the Best Attack Angle
Soon in our experiments, we realized that the angle of the
speaker towards the hard drive has a substantial influence on
the attack success. Therefore, we used the setting described in
Section IV-A to sample the space around the HDD under attack
and measure the maximum distance for a successful attack at
various angles. During all the measurements the amplitude of
the sound signal fed to the speaker was fixed to 15 V.
Figure 3 shows the spatial map of successful attack dis-
tances. The distance is color-coded and a farther distance
means more vulnerability in that spherical angle. Note that
only sampled angles are colored. Rectangles in this figure
indicate the position of the HDD and the small A marks are the
side away from the SATA circuitry. While two experimented
HDD models have distinct spacial attack maps, the attack
frequency seems to be of great importance to conduct a
successful attack. The farthest successfully performed attack
was at the distance of 71 cm (92.8 dBA) for the 1 TB HDD
at 9.1 kHz frequency, and 44 cm (102.6 dbA) for the 4 TB
HDD at 8.5 kHz.
V. DEMONSTRATION OF THE ATTACK IN REAL SETTINGS
Hard drives are used in many electronic devices where high
storage capacity is required. Using the insights from the last
section, we present attacks on a CCTV Digital Video Recorder
(DVR) as well as a desktop personal computer (PC) to prove
vulnerability of acoustic attacks on HDDs.
A. CCTV DVR
DVRs are used to store videos recorded by the CCTV sys-
tems. Every frame of video stored on a DVR could potentially
be highly crucial forensic evidence [14], [15]. Due to the
high storage capacity requirement as well as cost-effectiveness,
magnetic hard drives are the prevailing storage type in DVRs.
This means that our proposed acoustic DoS attack can expose
a major vulnerability in almost all of CCTV systems.
We evaluated this vulnerability by testing a commercial
DVR (ZOSI ZR08AN/00 H.264 NDVR). We installed the
4 TB HDD that was used in the previous section in the
DVR, and four digital security cameras were connected to it.
Sound 
Source
Fig. 4. Experimental setup for performing acoustic attacks on the digital
video recorder (DVR).
We then exposed the DVR to a sound wave with fixed 8.5
kHz frequency, which is a tested major attack frequency for
that HDD (see Figure 3). We thereupon audited the monitor
connected to the DVR for any anomalies. Figure 4 shows the
diagram of our test setup.
After around 230 seconds from starting the acoustic attack,
a pop-up warning window appeared on the monitor stating
“Disk lost!”. After stopping the sound, we attempted to replay
the recorded videos from four cameras and found out that
recordings had been interrupted. The corresponding warning
message is shown in Figure 5. We also tried formatting the
HDD using DVR’s Disk Management Tool, which failed. The
DVR had to be restarted to fix this issue, but the video footage
was permanently lost.
We believe the reason for data loss in this scenario is
memory buffer overflow. Normally, the DVR memory acts as
a buffer to temporarily store video data and guarantee that no
frame is lost, given an HDD’s variable write speed. However,
this buffer can overflow if the HDD write throughput is
predominantly less than the video data generation throughput.
In fact, although causing a full write termination can accelerate
this attack, even a partial write slowdown can lead to a
successful interruption of video recording.
It is worth mentioning that due to the blockage of sound
by the DVR case, the maximum attack distance was limited
to 15 cm using the same speaker setting as in the previous
section. Using more powerful sound sources can increase the
attack range accordingly.
B. Desktop PC
To evaluate the impact of our proposed acoustic attack
on an HDD which is enclosed in a PC case, we used a
desktop PC (Lenovo H520s) and installed the 1 TB HDD
used in Section IV on it. We chose the previously tested
9.1 kHz frequency (see Figure 3) for this experiment. We
then played the fixed-frequency sound from a 25-centimeter
distance towards the case’s airflow opening. This has caused
various kinds of malfunctions on the running PC that we report
in this section.
Fig. 5. The acoustic attack disrupting the video recording on a DVR.
TABLE II
DOS SYMPTOMS OF DIFFERENT OPERATING SYSTEMS ATTACKED.
OS Attack DoS Symptom RestartTime Required
Windows 10
< 5 sec Full file copy stoppage N
5 min
Blue screen Y
or
Error 1962: No operating system found Y
Ubuntu
16.04 LTS
< 5 sec Full file copy stoppage N
1.5 min Unresponsive OS Y
Fedora 27 < 5 sec Full file copy stoppage N
2 min Unresponsive OS Y
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 6. The acoustic DoS attack can lead to different malfunctions in a desktop
running Windows 10: (a) full stoppage of file copy as well as (b) black and
(c) blue screen errors.
We used three modern operating systems (OSs) to verify
the attack. Table II summarizes different observed anomaly
symptoms as a result of the acoustic attack. As seen, some
of the symptoms persist after stopping the sound and require
the PC to be restarted. Figure 6 shows errors when running
Windows 10 as the OS.
Such behaviors are entirely expected as the hard drive is the
primary storage unit containing the OS, application data, and
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Fig. 7. Main moving components inside a hard disk drive.
user data. While an HDD DoS attack can directly impact disk
write operations, it could also cause a critical kernel process
to freeze, requiring the system to be restarted.
VI. THE PHYSICS BEHIND THE ATTACK
Hard disk drives have one or more platters which are
covered with a magnetic coating. The information is stored as
magnetic orientation in small regions on this coating layer(s).
A moving head together with rotating platters enable access
to any point on this surface to perform read/write operations.
Figure 7 shows the main moving components inside an HDD.
Since a read/write operation requires precise placement of the
head at specific radii of platters, any abnormal movement of
these moving components can potentially lead to a failure.
However, a data access happens at the granularity of a sector
– a concentric circular track on the platter with a typical size of
512 bytes which is protected by error correcting codes (ECC).
These codes have enabled hard drives to work reliably despite
random failures. However, they fade if the number of failures
is more than a certain threshold for a sector.
Any material object has well-defined natural oscillation
eigenfrequencies, due to its constructive interference of inter-
nal and/or external surface waves [16]. Resonance is caused
when external waves at frequencies close to those natural
eigenfrequencies are scattered by the object [17]. We have
empirically observed that disk platters make an excellent target
for acoustic resonance attacks. This could be due to their
relatively large surface.
We have opened a hard drive to find resonance frequencies
for its moving components. Using a pen to exert mechanical
impulses on each component, we recorded waves scattered
from it. Each component leaves a unique pattern in the
frequency-domain from which the resonance frequencies be-
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Fig. 8. Extracting the resonance frequencies of an HDD platter. We opened
the hard drive and exerted mechanical impulses on platter, while recording
the scattered sound.
come evident. The unique pattern for HDD platters of that
specific hard drive (WD3200AAKS-75L9A0 in Table I) is
shown in Figure 8. For this hard drive, our observation was
that frequency ranges corresponding to the successful attack
are almost overlapping with the primary resonance frequency
range of HDD platters.
In our proposed acoustic attack, we generate sound waves
close to natural eigenfrequencies of HDD platters to cause
rotational vibrations. Customarily, specific mechanisms control
rotational vibrations in HDDs [18], [19], since they can
result in read/write failures [20]. However, it appears that
existing seek control mechanisms are not able to compensate
for persistent vibrations caused by the acoustic resonance.
Therefore, we believe that the primary means of fortifying
against this attack is to improve the seek control mechanisms
of hard drives.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss two categories of related research
studies: previous attacks against HDDs and acoustic-based
security attacks against computing systems.
A. Attacks against HDDs
Our proposed attack is among the first threats against
HDDs. A few prior research studies have shed light on the
susceptibility of storage components [4], [21]. Halderman et
al. [21] targeted DRAMs, volatile storage components that
lose their contents gradually over a period of seconds. They
presented a suite of attacks, referred to as cold boot attacks
that take advantage of DRAM remanence effects in an attempt
to recover cryptographic keys held in memory. They revealed
a severe threat against the security of laptop users who rely
on disk encryption products: they demonstrated that if an
adversary steals a laptop when its encrypted disk is mounted,
he can use their methodology to recover the contents. Bieder-
mann et al. [4] have discussed the possibility of capturing
and processing electromagnetic emanation of HDDs. They
demonstrated that the magnetic field generated by the moving
head of an HDD could be measured outside of the HDD to
extract information about ongoing operations. In particular,
they were able to detect what type of the operating system
is booting up or what application is being started. Our idea
is inspired by the suggestion that environmental conditions,
such as a high level of humidity or ambient noise, may
negatively affect the reliability of HDDs [12], [22], [23]. In
particular, in a blog post, Kruszelnicki [22] suggested that loud
environmental noise can degrade the performance of a hard
drive: he discussed that shouting at spinning HDDs located in
data centers may significantly drop their performance. The post
states that this observation was initially made back in 2008
by Brendan Gregg, an Australian computer engineer (Brendan
Gregg uploaded a demo on YouTube [23]). Finally, a recent
demo has demonstrated the HDD acoustic resonance attack
at a fixed frequency (130Hz) on a Linux machine [24]. We
were not able to conduct any successful attack or performance
degradation for our tested HDDs in that frequency.
B. Acoustic attacks against computing systems
A few recent studies have discussed how the presence of
acoustic noise can negatively degrade the performance of input
devices, in particular, sensors and microphones, used in real-
world systems. Dean et al. [25], [26] have examined how the
performance of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS)
gyroscopes may be negatively affected by environmental
acoustic noise. Son et al. [27] proposed an attack against
MEMS gyroscopes embedded in drones and demonstrated
that an attacker could incapacitate drones using intentional
sound noise. Trippel et al. [9] investigated how analog acoustic
injection attacks can damage the digital integrity of widely-
used MEMS accelerometer. They showed that spoofing ac-
celerometer data with intentional acoustic interference pro-
vides a pathway for adversaries to deliver arbitrary digital
values to embedded systems, which trust the integrity of sensor
readings. Carlini et al. [28] and Vaidya [29] have shown that
obfuscated (hidden in another sound in the audible range)
voice commands can be interpreted by speech recognition
systems. In two independent studies, Zhang et al. [30] and
Song et al. [31] have shown the vulnerability of microphones
against inaudible acoustic commands. They exploited the non-
linearity of the microphone circuits and created inaudible voice
commands that can be successfully picked up, demodulated,
recovered, and interpreted by the speech recognition systems,
such as Cortana, Alexa, and Siri. In this paper, we examined
how intentionally-created acoustic signals can degrade the
performance of a fundamental component of computing and
embedded systems, namely HDDs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Among storage components, HDDs have become the most
commonly-used type of non-volatile storage due to their en-
hanced energy efficiency, significantly-improved areal density,
and low cost. These have made them an inevitable part of
numerous computing systems, including, personal computers,
bedside monitors, CCTVs, and ATMs. Borrowing concepts
from acoustics and mechanics, we presented the first instance
of non-contact DoS attack against HDDs. The attack relies
on a physical phenomenon, known as acoustic resonance, in
which a sound wave forces an object to vibrate with a higher
amplitude at specific frequencies. Our attack is motivated by
the insight that real-world systems heavily rely on the avail-
ability of HDDs and inspired by the observation that acoustic
resonance can cause vibrations in an object. We conducted
a thorough examination of physical characteristics of funda-
mental components of HDDs (read/write head and platters)
and created acoustic signals that cause significant vibration
in HDD platters. These oscillations halt write/read operation
of embedded HDDs, leading to severe security concerns in
mission-critical systems. We demonstrated the feasibility of
the attack in two real-world case studies, namely, CCTVs,
and personal computers. Our proof-of-concept demonstrations
shed light on a new security threat against computing systems,
paving the way for further exploring overlooked vulnerabilities
of HDDs.
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